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We empirically study the interplay between exploration and competition. Systems that learn from interactions
with users often engage in exploration: making potentially suboptimal decisions in order to acquire new
information for future decisions. However, when multiple systems are competing for the same market of users,
exploration may hurt a system’s reputation in the near term, with adverse competitive effects. In particular, a
system may enter a “death spiral", when the short-term reputation cost decreases the number of users for the
system to learn from, which degrades the system’s performance relative to competition and further decreases
the market share.
We ask whether better exploration algorithms are incentivized under competition. We run extensive
numerical experiments in a stylized duopoly model in which two firms deploy multi-armed bandit algorithms
and compete for myopic users. We find that duopoly and monopoly tend to favor a primitive “greedy algorithm"
that does not explore and leads to low consumer welfare, whereas a temporary monopoly (a duopoly with an
early entrant) may incentivize better bandit algorithms and lead to higher consumer welfare. Our findings
shed light on the first-mover advantage in the digital economy by exploring the role that data can play as a
barrier to entry in online markets.
1 INTRODUCTION
Many modern online platforms simultaneously compete for users as well as learn from the users
they manage to attract. This creates a tension between exploration and competition: firms experiment
with potentially sub-optimal options for the sake of gaining information to make better decisions
tomorrow, while they need to incentivize consumers to select them over their competitors today.
For instance, Google Search and Bing compete for users in the search engine market yet at the
same time need to experiment with their search and ranking algorithms to learn what works best.
Similar exploration vs. competition tension arises in other application domains: recommendation
systems, news and entertainment websites, online commerce, and so forth.
Online platforms routinely deploy A/B tests, and are increasingly adopting more sophisticated
exploration methodologies based on multi-armed bandits, a well-known framework for making
decisions under uncertainty and trading off exploration and exploitation (making good near-term de-
cisions). While deploying “better" learning algorithms for exploration would improve performance,
this is not necessarily beneficial under competition, even putting aside the deployment/maintenance
costs. In particular, excessive experimentation may hurt a platform’s reputation and decrease its
market share in the near term. This would leave the learning algorithm with less users to learn
from, which may further degrade the platform’s performance relative to competitors who keep
learning and improving from their users, and so forth. Taken to the extreme, such dynamics may
create a “death spiral" effect when the vast majority of customers eventually switch to competitors.
In this paper, we ask how the interplay of exploration and competition affects platforms’ in-
centives. While some bandit algorithms are traditionally considered “better" than others in the
literature, does competition incentivize the adoption of the better algorithms? How is this
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Better algorithms
monopoly incumbent duopoly entrant
Fig. 1. A stylized “inverted-U relationship" between strength of competition and “level of innovation".
affected by the intensity of competition? We investigate these issues via extensive numerical
experiments in a stylized duopoly model.
Our model.We consider two firms that compete for users and simultaneously learn from them.
Each firm commits to a multi-armed bandit algorithm, and explores according to this algorithm.
Users select between the two firms based on the current reputation score: rewards from the firm’s
algorithm, averaged over a recent time window. Each firm’s objective is to maximize its market
share (the fraction of users choosing this firm).
We consider a permanent duopoly in which both firms start at the same time, as well as temporary
monopoly: a duopoly with a first-mover. Accordingly, the intensity of competition in the model
varies from “permanent monopoly" (just one firm) to “incumbent" (the first-mover in temporary
monopoly) to permanent duopoly to “entrant" (late-arriver in temporary monopoly).1
We focus on three classes of bandit algorithms, ranging from more primitive to more sophisti-
cated: greedy algorithms that do not explicitly explore, algorithms that separate exploration and
exploitation, and algorithms that combine the two. We know from prior work that in the absence
of competition, “better" algorithms are better in the long run, but could be worse initially.
Main findings.We find that in the permanent duopoly, competition incentivizes firms to choose
the “greedy algorithm", and even more so if the firm is a late arriver in a market. This algorithm also
prevails under monopoly, simply because it tends to be easier to deploy. Whereas the incumbent in
the temporary monopoly is incentivized to deploy a more advanced exploration algorithm. As a
result, consumer welfare is highest under temporary monopoly. We find strong evidence of the
“death spiral" effect mentioned earlier; this effect is strongest under permanent duopoly.
Interpreting the adoption of better algorithms as “innovation", our findings can be framed in
terms of the “inverted-U relationship" between competition and innovation (see Figure 1). This is a
well-established concept in the economics literature, dating back to [29], whereby too little or too
much competition is bad for innovation, but intermediate levels of competition tend to be better.
However, the “inverted-U relationship” is driven by different aspects in our model than the ones in
the existing literature in economics. In our case, the barriers for innovations arise entirely from the
reputational consequences of exploration in competition, as opposed to the R&D costs (which is
the more standard cause in prior work).
1We consider the “permanent monopoly" scenario for comparison only, without presenting any findings. We just assume
that a monopolist chooses the greedy algorithm, because it is easier to deploy in practice. Implicitly, users have no “outside
option": the service provided is an improvement over not having it (and therefore the monopolist is not incentivized to
deploy better learning algorithms). This is plausible with free ad-supported platforms such as Yelp or Google.
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Additional findings. We investigate the “first-mover advantage" phenomenon in more detail.
Being first in the market gives free data to learn from (a “data advantage") as well as a more definite,
and possibly better reputation compared to an entrant (a “reputation advantage"). We run additional
experiments so as to isolate and compare these two effects. We find that either effect alone leads to
a significant advantage under competition. The data advantage is larger than reputation advantage
when the incumbent commits to a more advanced bandit algorithm.
Data advantage is significant from the anti-trust perspective, as a possible barrier to entry. We
find that even a small amount “data advantage" gets amplified under competition, causing a large
difference in eventual market shares. This observation runs contrary to prior work [9, 23, 32], which
studied learning without competition, and found that small amounts of additional data do not
provide significant improvement in eventual outcomes. We conclude that competition dynamics –
that firms compete as they learn over time – are pertinent to these anti-trust considerations.
We also investigate how algorithms’ performance “in isolation" (without competition) is predic-
tive of the outcomes under competition. We find that mean reputation – arguably, the most natural
performance measure “in isolation" – is sometimes not a good predictor. We suggest a more refined
performance measure, and use it to explain some of the competition outcomes.
We also consider an alternative choice rule with explicit noise/randomness: a small fraction
of users choose a firm uniformly at random.2 We confirm the theoretical intuition that better
algorithms prevail if the expected number of “random" users is sufficiently large. However, we find
that this effect is negligible for some smaller but still “relevant" parameter values.
1.1 Discussion
The present paper is an experimental counterpart to [26], which considered a similar duopoly model
and obtained a number of theoretical results with “asymptotic" flavor. For the sake of analytical
tractability, that paper makes a somewhat unrealistic simplification that users do not observe
any signals about firms’ ongoing performance. Instead, users choose between firms according to
the firms’ Bayesian-expected rewards. The strength of competition is varied in a different way,
using assumptions about (ir)rational user behavior. For these reasons, the theorems from [26] have
no direct bearing on our simulations. However, their high-level conclusion in is an inverted-U
relationship similar to ours.
The present paper provides a more nuanced and “non-asymptotic" perspective. In essence,
we look for substantial effects within relevant time scales. Indeed, we start our investigation by
determining what time scales are relevant in the context of our model. The reputation-based
choice model accounts for competition in a more direct way, allows to separate reputation vs. data
advantage, and makes our model amenable to numerical simulations (unlike the model in [26]).
To elucidate the interplay of competition and exploration, our model is stylized in several
important respects, some of which we discuss below. Firms compete only on the quality of service,
rather than, say, pricing or the range of products. Various performance signals available to the
users, from personal experience to word-of-mouth to consumer reports, are abstracted as persistent
“reputation scores", which further simplified to average performance over a time window. On the
machine learning side, our setup is geared to distinguish between “simple" vs. “better" vs. “smart"
bandit algorithms; we are not interested in state-of-art algorithms for very realistic bandit settings.
Even with a stylized model, numerical investigation is quite challenging. An “atomic experiment"
is a competition game between a given pair of bandit algorithms, in a given competition model,
2Reputation scores already introduce some noise into users’ choices. However, the amount of noise due to this channel is
typically small, both in our simulations and in practice, because reputation signals average over many datapoints.
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on a given instance of a multi-armed bandit problem.3 Accordingly, we have a three-dimensional
space of atomic experiments one needs to run and interpret: {pairs of algorithms} x {competition
models} x {bandit instances}, and we are looking for findings that are consistent across this entire
space. It is essential to keep each of the three dimensions small yet representative. In particular, we
need to capture a huge variety of bandit instances with only a few representative examples. Further,
one needs succinct and informative summarization of results within one atomic experiment and
across multiple experiments (e.g., see Table 1).
While amenable to simulations, our model appears difficult to analyze. This is for several reasons:
intricate feedback loop from performance to reputations to users to performance; mean reputation,
most connected to our intuition, is sometimes a bad predictor in competition (see Sections 3 and 6);
mathematical tools from regret-minimization would only produce “asymptotic" results, which do
not seem to suffice. Further, we believe that resolving first-order theoretical questions about our
model would not add much value to this paper. Indeed, we are in the realm of stylized economic
models that provide mathematical intuition about the world, and [26] already has an elaborate
analysis with similar high-level conclusions.
1.2 Related work
Machine learning. Multi-armed bandits (MAB) is a tractable abstraction for the tradeoff between
exploration and exploitation. MAB problems have been studied for many decades, see [14, 24] for
background on this immense body of work; we only comment on the most related aspects.
We consider MAB with i.i.d. rewards, a well-studied and well-understood MAB model [6].
We focus on a well-known distinction between “greedy" (exploitation-only) algorithms, “naive"
algorithms that separate exploration and exploitation, and “smart" algorithms that combine them.
Switching from “greedy" to “naive" to “smart" algorithms involves substantial adoption costs in
infrastructure and personnel training [1, 2].
The study of competition vs. exploration has been initiated in [26], as discussed above. Our
setting is also closely related to the “dueling algorithms" framework [20], but this framework
considers offline / full feedback scenarios whereas we focus on online machine learning problems.
In “dueling bandits" (e.g., [33, 34]), an algorithm sets up a “duel" between a pair of arms in each
round, and only learns which arm has “won". While this setting features a form of competition
inside an MAB problem, it is very different from ours.
The interplay between exploration, exploitation and incentives has been studied in other sce-
narios: incentivizing exploration in a recommendation system, e.g., [12, 15, 17, 22, 25], dynamic
auctions (see [11] for background), online ad auctions, e.g., [7, 8, 16, 27], human computation
[18, 19, 30], and repeated auctions, e.g., [4, 5, 13].
Economics. Our work is related to a longstanding economics literature on competition vs. innova-
tion, e.g., [3, 10, 29]. While this literature focuses on R&D costs of innovation, “reputational costs"
seem new and specific to exploration.
Whether data gives competitive advantage has been studied theoretically in [23, 32] and empiri-
cally in [9]. While these papers find that small amounts of additional data do not provide significant
improvement, they focus on learning in isolation. The first-mover advantage has been well-studied
in other settings in economics and marketing, see survey [21].
The most common measures of market “competitiveness" such as the Lerner Index or the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of a market rely on ex-post observable attributes of a market such as
prices or market shares [31]. However, neither is applicable to our setting: in our model, there are
no prices, and market shares are endogenous.
3Each such experiment is run many times to reduce variance.
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2 MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
We consider a game involving two firms and T customers (henceforth, agents). The game lasts for
T rounds. In each round, a new agent arrives, chooses among the two firms, interacts with the
chosen firm, and leaves forever.
Each interaction between a firm and an agent proceeds as follows. There is a set A of K actions,
henceforth arms, same for both firms and all rounds. The firm chooses an arm, and the agent
experiences a numerical reward observed by the firm. Each arm corresponds to a different version
of the experience that a firm can provide for an agent, and the reward corresponds to the agent’s
satisfaction level. The other firm does not observe anything about this interaction, not even the
fact that this interaction has happened.
From each firm’s perspective, the interactions with agents follow the protocol of the multi-armed
bandit problem (MAB). We focus on i.i.d. Bernoulli rewards: the reward of each arm a is drawn from
{0, 1} independently with expectation µ(a). The mean rewards µ(a) are the same for all rounds and
both firms, but initially unknown.
Before the game starts, each firm commits to an MAB algorithm, and uses this algorithm to
choose its actions. Each algorithm receives a “warm start": additional T0 agents that arrive before
the game starts, and interact with the firm as described above. The warm start ensures that each
firm has a meaningful reputation when competition starts. Each firm’s objective is to maximize its
market share: the fraction of users who chose this firm.
In some of our experiments, one firm is the “incumbent" who enters the market before the
other (“late entrant"), and therefore enjoys a temporary monopoly. Formally, the incumbent enjoys
additional X rounds of the “warm start". We treat X as an exogenous element of the model, and
study the consequences for a fixed X .
Agents. Firms compete on a single dimension, quality of service, as expressed by agents’ rewards.
Agents are myopic and non-strategic: they would like to choose among the firms so as to maximize
their expected reward (i.e. select the firm with the highest quality), without attempting to influence
the firms’ learning algorithms or rewards of the future users. Agents are not well-informed: they
only receive a rough signal about each firm’s performance before they choose a firm, and no other
information.
Concretely, each of the two firms has a reputation score, and each agent’s choice is driven by these
two numbers. We posit a version of rational behavior: each agent chooses a firm with a maximal
reputation score (breaking ties uniformly). The reputation score is simply a sliding window average:
an average reward of the lastM agents that chose this firm.
MAB algorithms.We consider three classes of algorithms, ranging from more primitive to more
sophisticated:
(1) Greedy algorithms that strive to take actions with maximal mean reward, based on the current
information.
(2) Exploration-separating algorithms that separate exploration and exploitation. The “exploita-
tion" choices strives to maximize mean reward in the next round, and the “exploration"
choices do not use the rewards observed so far.
(3) Adaptive exploration: algorithms that combine exploration and exploitation, and sway the
exploration choices towards more promising alternatives.
We are mainly interested in qualitative differences between the three classes. For concreteness,
we fix one algorithm from each class. Our pilot experiments indicate that our findings do not
change substantially if other algorithms are chosen. For technical reasons, we consider Bayesian
versions initialized with a “fake" prior (i.e., not based on actual knowledge). We consider:
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(1) a greedy algorithm that chooses an arm with largest posterior mean reward. We call it
"Dynamic Greedy" (because the chosen arm may change over time), DG in short.
(2) an exploration-separated algorithm that in each round, explores with probability ε : chooses
an arm independently and uniformly at random, and with the remaining probability exploits
according to DG. We call it “dynamic epsilon-greedy", DEG in short.4
(3) an adaptive-exploration algorithm called “Thompson Sampling" (TS). In each round, this
algorithm updates the posterior distribution for the mean reward of each arm a, draws an
independent sample sa from this distribution, and chooses an arm with the largest sa .
For ease of comparison, all three algorithms are parameterized with the same fake prior: namely,
the mean reward of each arm is drawn independently from a Beta(1, 1) distribution. Recall that
Beta priors with 0-1 rewards form a conjugate family, which allows for simple posterior updates.
Both DEG and TS are classic and well-understood MAB algorithms, see [14, 28] for background.
It is well-known that TS is near-optimal in terms of the cumulative rewards, and DEG is very
suboptimal, but still much better than DG.5 In a stylized formula: TS ≫ DEG ≫ DG as stand-alone
MAB algorithms.
MAB instances. We consider instances with K = 10 arms. Since we focus on 0-1 rewards, an
instance of the MAB problem is specified by the mean reward vector (µ(a) : a ∈ A). Initially this
vector is drawn from some distribution, termed MAB instance. We consider three MAB instances:
(1) Needle-In-Haystack: one arm (the “needle") is chosen uniformly at random. This arm has
mean reward .7, and the remaining ones have mean reward .5.
(2) Uniform instance: the mean reward of each arm is drawn independently and uniformly from
[1/4, 3/4].
(3) Heavy-Tail instance: the mean reward of each arm is drawn independently from Beta(.6, .6)
distribution (which is known to have substantial “tail probabilities").
We argue that these MAB instances are (somewhat) representative. Consider the “gap" between
the best and the second-best arm, an essential parameter in the literature on MAB. The “gap" is
fixed in Needle-in-Haystack, spread over a wide spectrum of values under the Uniform instance,
and is spread but focused on the large values under the Heavy-Tail instance. We also ran smaller
experiments with versions of these instances, and achieved similar qualitative results.
Terminology. Following a standard game-theoretic terminology, algorithm Alg1 (weakly) domi-
nates algorithm Alg2 for a given firm if Alg1 provides a larger (or equal) market share than Alg2
at the end of the game. An algorithm is a (weakly) dominant strategy for the firm if it (weakly)
dominates all other algorithms. This is for a particular MAB instance and a particular selection of
the game parameters.
Simulation details. For eachMAB instancewe drawN = 1000mean reward vectors independently
from the corresponding distribution. We use this same collection of mean reward vectors for all
experiments with this MAB instance. For each mean reward vector we draw a table of realized
rewards (realization table), and use this same table for all experiments on this mean reward vector.
This ensures that differences in algorithm performance are not due to noise in the realizations but
due to differences in the algorithms in the different experimental settings.
More specifically, the realization table is a 0-1 matrixW with K columns which correspond to
arms, and T +Tmax rows, which correspond to rounds. Here Tmax is the maximal duration of the
4Throughout, we fix ε = 0.05. Our pilot experiments showed that different ε did not qualitatively change the results.
5Formally, TS achieves regret O˜ (√TK ) and O ( 1∆ logT ), where ∆ is the gap in mean rewards between the best and second-
best arms. DEG has regret Θ˜(T 2/3K 1/3) in the worst case. And DG can have regret as high as Ω(T ). Deeper discussion of
these distinctions is not very relevant to this paper.
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Fig. 2. Mean reputation trajectories for Needle-in-Haystack. The shaded area shows 95% confidence intervals.
“warm start" in our experiments, i.e., the maximal value ofX +T0. For each arm a, each valueW (·,a)
is drawn independently from Bernoulli distribution with expectation µ(a). Then in each experiment,
the reward of this arm in round t of the warm start is taken to beW (t ,a), and its reward in round t
of the game isW (Tmax + t ,a).
We fix the sliding window sizeM = 100. We found that lower values induced too much random
noise in the results, and increasingM further did not make a qualitative difference. Unless otherwise
noted, we used T = 2000.
The simulations are computationally intensive. An experiment on a particular MAB instance
comprisedmultiple runs of the competition game:N mean reward vectors times 9 pairs of algorithms
times three values for the warm start. We used a parallel implementation over a cluster of 12 2.2
GHz CPU cores, with 8 GB RAM per core. Each experiment took about 10 hours.
Consistency.While we experiment with various MAB instances and parameter settings, we only
report on selected, representative experiments in the body of the paper. Additional plots and tables
are provided in the appendix. Unless noted otherwise, our findings are based on and consistent
with all these experiments.
3 PERFORMANCE IN ISOLATION
We start with a pilot experiment in whichwe investigate each algorithm’s performance “in isolation":
in a stand-alone MAB problem without competition. We focus on reputation scores generated by
each algorithm. We confirm that algorithms’ performance is ordered as we’d expect: TS > DEG > DG
for a sufficiently long time horizon. For each algorithm and each MAB instance, we compute
the mean reputation score at each round, averaged over all mean reward vectors. We plot the
mean reputation trajectory: how this score evolves over time. Figure 2 shows such a plot for the
Needle-in-Haystack instance; for other MAB instances the plots are similar. We summarize this
finding as follows:
Finding 1. The mean reputation trajectories are arranged as predicted by prior work: TS > DEG > DG
for a sufficiently long time horizon.
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We also use Figure 2 to choose a reasonable time-horizon for the subsequent experiments, as
T = 2000. The idea is, we want T to be large enough so that algorithms performance starts to
plateau, but small enough such that algorithms are still learning.
The mean reputation trajectory is probably the most natural way to represent an algorithm’s
performance on a given MAB instance. However, we found that the outcomes of the competition
game are better explained with a different “performance-in-isolation" statistic that is more directly
connected to the game. Consider the performance of two algorithms, Alg1 and Alg2, “in isolation"
on a particular MAB instance. The relative reputation of Alg1 (vs. Alg2) at a given time t is the
fraction of mean reward vectors/realization tables for which Alg1 has a higher reputation score
than Alg2. The intuition is that agent’s selection in our model depends only on the comparison
between the reputation scores.
Fig. 3. Relative reputation trajectory for TS vs DG, on Uniform instance (top) and Needle-in-Haystack instance
(bottom). Shaded area display 95% confidence intervals.
This angle allows a more nuanced analysis of reputation costs vs. benefits under competition.
Figure 3 (top) shows the relative reputation trajectory for TS vs DG for the Uniform instance. The
relative reputation is less than 12 in the early rounds, meaning that DG has a higher reputation score
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Heavy-Tail Needle-in-Haystack
T0 = 20 T0 = 250 T0 = 500 T0 = 20 T0 = 250 T0 = 500
TS vs DG 0.29 ±0.03
EoG 55 (0)
0.72 ±0.02
EoG 570 (0)
0.76 ±0.02
EoG 620 (99)
0.64 ±0.03
EoG 200 (27)
0.6 ±0.03
EoG 370 (0)
0.64 ±0.03
EoG 580 (122)
TS vs DEG 0.3 ±0.03
EoG 37 (0)
0.88 ±0.01
EoG 480 (0)
0.9 ±0.01
EoG 570 (114)
0.57 ±0.03
EoG 150 (14)
0.52 ±0.03
EoG 460 (79)
0.56 ±0.02
EoG 740 (628)
DG vs DEG 0.62 ±0.03
EoG 410 (7)
0.6 ±0.02
EoG 790 (762)
0.57 ±0.03
EoG 730 (608)
0.46 ±0.03
EoG 340 (129)
0.42 ±0.02
EoG 650 (408)
0.42 ±0.02
EoG 690 (467)
Table 1. Permanent duopoly, for Heavy-Tail and Needle-in-Haystack instances. Each cell describes a game
between two algorithms, call them Alg1 vs. Alg2, for a particular value of the warm start T0. Line 1 in the cell
is the market share of Alg 1: the average (in bold) and the 95% confidence band. Line 2 specifies the “effective
end of game" (EoG): the average and the median (in brackets). The time horizon is T = 2000.
in a majority of the simulations, and more than 12 later on. The reason is the exploration in TS leads
to worse decisions initially, but allows for better decisions later. The time period when relative
reputation vs. DG dips below 12 can be seen as an explanation for the competitive disadvantage of
exploration. Such period also exists for the Heavy-Tail MAB instance. However, it does not exist
for the Needle-in-Haystack instance, see Figure 3 (bottom).6
Finding 2. Exploration can lead to relative reputation vs. DG going below 12 for some initial time
period. This happens for some MAB instances but not for some others.
Definition 3.1. For a particular MAB algorithm, a time period when relative reputation vs. DG
goes below 12 is called exploration disadvantage period. An MAB instance is called exploration-
disadvantaged if such period exists.
Uniform and Heavy-tail instance are exploration-disadvantaged, but Needle-in-Haystack is not.
4 COMPETITION VS. BETTER ALGORITHMS
Our main experiments are with the duopoly game defined in Section 2. As the “intensity of
competition" varies from permanent monopoly to “incumbent" to permanent duopoly to “late
entrant", we find a stylized inverted-U relationship as in Figure 1. More formally, we look for
equilibria in the duopoly game, where each firm’s choices are limited to DG, DEG and TS. We do this
for each “intensity level" and each MAB instance, and look for findings that are consistent across
MAB instances. For cleaner results, we break ties towards less advanced algorithms (as they tend to
have lower adoption costs [1, 2]). Note that DG is trivially the dominant strategy under permanent
monopoly.
Permanent duopoly. The basic scenario is when both firms are competing from round 1. A crucial
distinction is whether an MAB instance is exploration-disadvantaged:
Finding 3. Under permanent duopoly:
(a) (DG,DG) is the unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for exploration-disadvantaged MAB in-
stances with a sufficiently small “warm start".
(b) This is not necessarily the case for MAB instances that are not exploration-disadvantaged. In
particular, TS is a weakly dominant strategy for Needle-in-Haystack.
6We see two explanations for this: TS identifies the best arm faster for the Needle-in-Haystack instance, and there are no
“very bad" arms which make exploration very expensive in the short term.
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We investigate the firms’ market shares when they choose different algorithms (otherwise, by
symmetry both firms get half of the agents). We report the market shares for Heavy-Tail and
Needle-in-Haystack instances in Table 1 (see the first line in each cell), for a range of values of
the warm start T0. Table 2 reports similarly on the Uniform instance. We find that DG is a weakly
dominant strategy for the Heavy-Tail and Uniform instances, as long as T0 is sufficiently small.
However, TS is a weakly dominant strategy for the Needle-in-Haystack instance. We find that for a
sufficiently small T0, DG yields more than half the market against TS, but achieves similar market
share vs. DG and DEG. By our tie-breaking rule, (DG,DG) is the only pure-strategy equilibrium.
T0 = 20 T0 = 250 T0 = 500
TS vs DG 0.46 ±0.03 0.52 ±0.02 0.6 ±0.02
TS vs DEG 0.41 ±0.03 0.51 ±0.02 0.55 ±0.02
DG vs DEG 0.51 ±0.03 0.48 ±0.02 0.45 ±0.02
Table 2. Permanent duopoly, for the Uniform MAB instance. Semantics are the same as in Table 1.
We attribute the prevalence of DG on exploration-disadvantaged MAB instances to its prevalence
on the initial “exploration disadvantage period", as described in Section 3. Increasing the warm start
length T0 makes this period shorter: indeed, considering relative reputation trajectory in Figure 3
(top), increasing T0 effectively shifts the starting time point to the right. This is why it helps DG if
T0 is small.
Temporary Monopoly.We turn our attention to the temporary monopoly scenario. Recall that
the incumbent firm enters the market and serves as a monopolist until the entrant firm enters at
round X . We make X large enough, but still much smaller than the time horizon T . We find that
the incumbent is incentivized to choose TS, in a strong sense:
Finding 4. Under temporary monopoly, TS is the dominant strategy for the incumbent. This holds
across all MAB instances, if X is large enough.
The simulation results for the Heavy-Tail MAB instance are reported in Table 3, for a particular
X = 200. We see that TS is a dominant strategy for the incumbent. Similar tables for the other MAB
instances and other values of X are reported in the supplement, with the same conclusion.
TS DEG DG
TS 0.003±0.003 0.083±0.02 0.17±0.02
DEG 0.045±0.01 0.25±0.02 0.23±0.02
DG 0.12±0.02 0.36±0.03 0.3±0.02
Table 3. Temporary monopoly, with X = 200 (and T0 = 20), for the Heavy-Tail MAB instance. Each cell
describes the duopoly game between the entrant’s algorithm (the row) and the incumbent’s algorithm (the
column). The cell specifies the entrant’s market share (fraction of rounds in which it was chosen) for the
rounds in which he was present. We give the average (in bold) and the 95% confidence interval. NB: smaller
average is better for the incumbent.
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DG is a weakly dominant strategy for the entrant, for Heavy-Tail instance in Table 3 and the Uni-
form instance, but not for the Needle-in-Haystack instance. We attribute this finding to exploration-
disadvantaged property of these two MAB instance, for the same reasons as discussed above.
Finding 5. Under temporary monopoly, DG is a weakly dominant strategy for the entrant for
exploration-disadvantaged MAB instances.
Inverted-U relationship.We interpret our findings through the lens of the inverted-U relation-
ship between the “intensity of competition" and the “quality of technology". The lowest level of
competition is monopoly, when DG wins out for the trivial reason of tie-breaking. The highest
levels are permanent duopoly and “late entrant". We see that DG is incentivized for exploration-
disadvantaged MAB instances. In fact, incentives for DG get stronger when the model transitions
from permanent duopoly to “late entrant".7 Finally, the middle level of competition, “incumbent"
in the temporary monopoly creates strong incentives for TS. In stylized form, this relationship is
captured in Figure 1.
Our intuition for why incumbency creates more incentives for exploration is as follows. During
the temporary monopoly period, reputation costs of exploration vanish. Instead, the firm wants to
improve its performance as much as possible by the time competition starts. Essentially, the firm
only faces a classical explore-exploit tradeoff, and is incentivized to choose algorithms that are best
at optimizing this tradeoff.
Death spiral effect. Further, we investigate the “death spiral" effect mentioned in the Introduction.
Restated in terms of our model, the effect is that one firm attracts new customers at a lower rate
than the other, and falls behind in terms of performance because the other firm has more customers
to learn from, and this gets worse over time until (almost) all new customers go to the other firm.
With this intuition in mind, we define effective end of game (EoG) for a particular mean reward
vector and realization table, as the last round t such that the agents at this and previous round
choose different firms. Indeed, the game, effectively, ends after this round. We interpret low EoG
as a strong evidence of the “death spiral" effect. Focusing on the permanent duopoly scenario, we
specify the EoG values in Table 1 (the second line of each cell). We find that the EoG values are
indeed small:
Finding 6. Under permanent duopoly, EoG values tend to be much smaller than the time horizon T .
We also see that the EoG values tend to increase as the warm start T0 increases. We conjecture
this is because larger T0 tends to be more beneficial for a better algorithm (as it tends to follow a
better learning curve). Indeed, we know that the “effective end of game" in this scenario typically
occurs when a better algorithm loses, and helping it delays the loss.
Welfare implications.We study the effects of competition on consumer welfare: the total reward
collected by the users over time. Rather than welfare directly, we find it more lucid to consider
market regret:
T maxa µ(a) −∑t ∈[T ] µ(at ),
where at is the arm chosen by agent t . This is a standard performance measure in the literature on
multi-armed bandits. Note that smaller regret means higher welfare.
We assume that both firms play their respective equilibrium strategies for the corresponding
competition level. As discussed previously, these are:
• DG in the monopoly,
7For the Heavy-Tail instance, DG goes from a weakly dominant startegy to a strictly dominant one. For the Uniform instance,
DG goes from a Nash equilibrium strategy to a weakly dominant one.
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Fig. 4. Smoothed welfare plots resulting from equilibrium strategies in the different market structures. Note
that welfare at t = 0 incorporates the regret incurred during the incumbent and warm start periods.
Fig. 5. Average welfare and EoG as we increase #firms playing DG
• DG for both firms in duopoly (Finding 3),
• TS for the incumbent (Finding 4) and DG for the entrant in temporary monopoly (Finding 5).
Figure 4 displays the market regret (averaged over multiple runs) under different levels of
competition. Consumers are better off in the temporary monopoly case than in the duopoly case.
Recall that under temporary monopoly, the incumbent is incentivized to play TS. Moreover, we
find that the welfare is close to that of having a single firm for all agents and running TS. We also
observe that monopoly and duopoly achieve similar welfare.
Finding 7. In equilibrium, consumer welfare is (a) highest under temporary monopoly, (b) similar
for monopoly and duopoly.
Finding 7(b) is interesting because, in equilibrium, both firms play DG in both settings, and one
might conjecture that the welfare should increase with the number of firms playing DG. Indeed, one
run of DG may get stuck on a bad arm. However, two firms independently playing DG are less likely
to get stuck simultaneously. If one firm gets stuck and the other does not, then the latter should
attract most agents, leading to improved welfare.
To study this phenomenon further, we go beyond the duopoly setting to more than two firms
playing DG (and starting at the same time). Figure 5 reports the average welfare across these
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simulations. Welfare not only does not get better, but is weakly worse as we increase the number of
firms.
Finding 8. When all firms deploy DG, and start at the same time, welfare is weakly decreasing as the
number of firms increases
We track the average EoG in each of the simulations and notice that it increases with the number
of firms. This observation also runs counter of the intuition that with more firms running DG, one
of them is more likely to “get lucky" and take over the market (which would cause EoG to decrease
with the number of firms).
5 DATA AS A BARRIER TO ENTRY
Under temporary monopoly, the incumbent can explore without incurring immediate reputational
costs, and build up a high reputation before the entrant appears. Thus, the early entry gives the
incumbent both a data advantage and a reputational advantage over the entrant. We explore which
of the two factors is more significant. Our findings provide a quantitative insight into the role of
the classic “first mover advantage" phenomenon in the digital economy.
For a more succinct terminology, recall that the incumbent enjoys an extended warm start of
X +T0 rounds. Call the firstX of these rounds themonopoly period (and the rest is the proper “warm
start"). The rounds when both firms are competing for customers are called competition period.
We run two additional experiments to isolate the effects of the two advantages mentioned
above. The data-advantage experiment focuses on the data advantage by, essentially, erasing the
reputation advantage. Namely, the data from the monopoly period is not used in the computation
of the incumbent’s reputation score. Likewise, the reputation-advantage experiment erases the data
advantage and focuses on the reputation advantage: namely, the incumbent’s algorithm ‘forgets’
the data gathered during the monopoly period.
We find that either data or reputational advantage alone gives a substantial boost to the incumbent,
compared to permanent duopoly. The results for the Heavy-Tail instance are presented in Table 4,
in the same structure as Table 3. For the other two instances, the results are qualitatively similar.
Reputation advantage Data advantage
TS DEG DG TS DEG DG
TS 0.021±0.009 0.16±0.02 0.21 ±0.02 0.0096±0.006 0.11±0.02 0.18±0.02
DEG 0.26±0.03 0.3±0.02 0.26±0.02 0.073±0.01 0.29±0.02 0.25±0.02
DG 0.34±0.03 0.4±0.03 0.33±0.02 0.15±0.02 0.39±0.03 0.33±0.02
Table 4. Data advantage vs. reputation advantage experiment, onHeavy-Tail MAB instance. Each cell describes
the duopoly game between the entrant’s algorithm (the row) and the incumbent’s algorithm (the column).
The cell specifies the entrant’s market share for the rounds in which hit was present: the average (in bold)
and the 95% confidence interval. NB: smaller average is better for the incumbent.
We can quantitatively define the data (resp., reputation) advantage as the incumbent’s market
share in the competition period in the data-advantage (resp., reputation advantage) experiment,
minus the said share under permanent duopoly, for the same pair of algorithms and the same
problem instance. In this language, our findings are as follows.
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Finding 9.
(a) Data advantage and reputation advantage alone are substantially large, across all algorithms and
all MAB instances.
(b) The data advantage is larger than the reputation advantage when the incumbent chooses TS.
(c) The two advantages are similar in magnitude when the incumbent chooses DEG or DG.
Our intuition for Finding 9(b) is as follows. Suppose the incumbent switches from DG to TS. This
switch allows the incumbent to explore actions more efficiently – collect better data in the same
number of rounds – and therefore should benefit the data advantage. However, the same switch
increases the reputation cost of exploration in the short run, which could weaken the reputation
advantage.
6 PERFORMANCE IN ISOLATION, REVISITED
We saw in Section 4 that mean reputation trajectories do not suffice to explain the outcomes under
competition. Let us provide more evidence and intuition for this.
Mean reputation trajectories are so natural that one is tempted to conjecture that they determine
the outcomes under competition. More specifically:
Conjecture 6.1. If one algorithm’s mean reputation trajectory lies above another, perhaps after
some initial time interval (e.g., as in Figure 2), then the first algorithm prevails under competition, for
a sufficiently large warm start T0.
However, we find a more nuanced picture. For example, in Figure 1 we see that DG attains a
larger market share than DEG even for large warm starts. We find that this also holds for K = 3
arms and longer time horizons, see the supplement for more details. We conclude:
Finding 10. Conjecture 6.1 is false: mean reputation trajectories do not suffice to explain the outcomes
under competition.
To see what could go wrong with Conjecture 6.1, consider how an algorithm’s reputation score
is distributed at a particular time. That is, consider the empirical distribution of this score over
different mean reward vectors.8 For concreteness, consider the Needle-in-Haystack instance at time
t = 500, plotted in Figure 6. (The other MAB instances lead to a similar intuition.)
We see that the “naive" algorithms DG and DEG have a bi-modal reputation distribution, whereas
TS does not. The reason is that for this MAB instance, DG either finds the best arm and sticks to
it, or gets stuck on the bad arms. In the former case DG does slightly better than TS, and in the
latter case it does substantially worse. However, the mean reputation trajectory may fail to capture
this complexity since it simply takes average over different mean reward vectors. This may be
inadequate for explaining the outcome of the duopoly game, given that the latter is determined by
a simple comparison between the firm’s reputation scores.
To further this intuition, consider the difference in reputation scores (reputation difference)
between TS and DG on a particular mean reward vector. Let’s plot the empirical distribution of the
reputation difference (over the mean reward vectors) at a particular time point. Figure 7 shows
such plots for several time points. We observe that the distribution is skewed to the right, precisely
due to the fact that DG either does slightly better than TS or does substantially worse. Therefore,
the mean is not a good measure of the central tendency, or typical value, of this distribution.
8Recall that each mean reward vector in our experimental setup comes with one specific realization table.
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Fig. 6. Reputation scores for Needle-in-Haystack at t = 500 (smoothed using a kernel density estimate)
Fig. 7. Reputation difference TS − DG for Needle-in-Haystack (smoothed using a kernel density estimate)
7 NON-DETERMINISTIC CHOICE MODELS
Let us consider an extension in which the agents’ choice is no longer deterministic. Recall that in
our main model agents deterministically choose the firm with the higher reputation score; call this
choice rule HardMax (HM). Now, we introduce some randomness: each agent selects between the
firms uniformly with probability ε ∈ (0, 1), and takes the firm with the higher reputation score
with the remaining probability; call this choice rule HardMax with randomness (HMR).
One can view HMR as a version of “warm start", where a firm receives some customers without
competition, but these customers are dispersed throughout the game. The expected duration of
this “dispersed warm start" is εT . If this quantity is large enough, we expect better algorithms to
reach their long-term performance and prevail in competition. We confirm this intuition; we also
find that this effect is negligible for smaller (but still relevant) values of ε or T .
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Heavy-Tail (HMR with ε = .1) Heavy-Tail (HM)
TS vs DG TS vs DEG DG vs DEG TS vs DG TS vs DEG DG vs DEG
T = 2000 0.43 ± 0.02Var: 0.15
0.44 ± 0.02
Var: 0.15
0.6 ± 0.02
Var: 0.1
0.29 ± 0.03
Var: 0.2
0.28 ± 0.03
Var: 0.19
0.63 ± 0.03
Var: 0.18
T = 5000 0.66 ± 0.01Var: 0.056
0.59 ± 0.02
Var: 0.092
0.56 ± 0.02
Var: 0.098
0.29 ± 0.03
Var: 0.2
0.29 ± 0.03
Var: 0.2
0.62 ± 0.03
Var: 0.19
T = 10000 0.76 ± 0.01Var: 0.026
0.67 ± 0.02
Var: 0.067
0.52 ± 0.02
Var: 0.11
0.3 ± 0.03
Var: 0.21
0.3 ± 0.03
Var: 0.2
0.6 ± 0.03
Var: 0.2
Table 5. HM and HMR choice models on the Heavy-Tail MAB instance. Each cell describes the market shares in
a game between two algorithms, call them Alg1 vs. Alg2, at a particular value of t . Line 1 in the cell is the
market share of Alg 1: the average (in bold) and the 95% confidence band. Line 2 specifies the variance of the
market shares across the simulations. The results reported here are with T0 = 20.
Uniform (HMR with ε = .1) Needle-In-Haystack (HMR with ε = .1)
TS vs DG TS vs DEG DG vs DEG TS vs DG TS vs DEG DG vs DEG
T = 2000 0.42 ± 0.02Var: 0.13
0.45 ± 0.02
Var: 0.13
0.49 ± 0.02
Var: 0.093
0.55 ± 0.02
Var: 0.15
0.61 ± 0.02
Var: 0.13
0.46 ± 0.02
Var: 0.12
T = 5000 0.48 ± 0.02Var: 0.089
0.53 ± 0.02
Var: 0.098
0.46 ± 0.02
Var: 0.072
0.56 ± 0.02
Var: 0.13
0.63 ± 0.02
Var: 0.12
0.43 ± 0.02
Var: 0.11
T = 10000 0.54 ± 0.01Var: 0.055
0.6 ± 0.02
Var: 0.073
0.44 ± 0.02
Var: 0.064
0.58 ± 0.02
Var: 0.083
0.65 ± 0.02
Var: 0.096
0.4 ± 0.02
Var: 0.1
Table 6. HMR choice model for Uniform and Needle-In-Haystack MAB instances.
Finding 11. TS is weakly dominant under the HMR choice rule, if and only if εT is sufficiently large.
HMR leads to lower variance in market shares, compared to HM.
Table 5 shows the average market shares under the HM vs HMR choice rule. In contrast to the
HM model, TS becomes weakly dominant under the HMR model, as T gets sufficiently large. These
findings hold across all problem instances, see Table 6 (with the same semantics as in Table 5).
However, it takes a significant amount of randomness and a relatively large time horizon for this
effect to take place. Even with T = 10000 and ε = 0.1 we see that DEG still outperforms DG on the
Heavy-Tail MAB instance as well as that TS only starts to become weakly dominant at T = 10000
for the Uniform MAB instance.
8 CONCLUSION
We consider a stylized duopoly setting where firms simultaneously learn from and compete for
users. We showed that competition may not always induce firms to commit to better exploration
algorithms, resulting in welfare losses for consumers. The primary reason is that exploration
may have short-term reputational consequences that lead to more naive algorithms winning in a
long-term competition. Allowing one firm to have a head start, a.k.a. the first-mover advantage,
incentivizes the first-mover to deploy “better" algorithms, which in turn leads to better welfare for
consumers. Finally, we isolate the component of the first-mover advantage that is due to having
more initial data, and find that even a small amount of this “data advantage" leads to substantial
long-term market power.
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Appendices
We provide plots and tables for our experiments, which were omitted from the main text due to
page constraints. In all cases, the plots and tables here are in line with those in the main text, and
lead to similar qualitative conclusions.
A PLOTS FOR “PERFORMANCE IN ISOLATION"
We present additional plots for Section 3. First, we provide mean reputation trajectories for Uniform
and Heavy-Tail MAB instances. Second, we provide trajectories for instantaneous mean rewards,
for all three MAB instances.9 In all plots, the shaded area represents 95% confidence interval.
9These trajectories are smoothed via a non-parametric regression. More concretely, we use this option in ggplot: https:
//ggplot2.tidyverse.org/reference/geom_smooth.html.
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B TEMPORARY MONOPOLY
We present additional experiments on temporary monopoly from Section 4, across various MAB
instances and various values of the incumbent advantage parameter X .
Each experiment is presented as a table with the same semantics as in the main text. Namely,
each cell in the table describes the duopoly game between the entrant’s algorithm (the row) and
the incumbent’s algorithm (the column). The cell specifies the entrant’s market share (fraction of
rounds in which it was chosen) for the rounds in which he was present. We give the average (in
bold) and the 95% confidence interval. NB: smaller average is better for the incumbent.
Heavy-Tail MAB Instance
TS DEG DG
TS 0.054 ±0.01 0.16 ±0.02 0.18 ±0.02
DEG 0.33 ±0.03 0.31 ±0.02 0.26 ±0.02
DG 0.39 ±0.03 0.41 ±0.03 0.33 ±0.02
Table 7. Temporary Monopoly: Heavy Tail, X = 50
TS DEG DG
TS 0.003 ±0.003 0.083 ±0.02 0.17 ±0.02
DEG 0.045 ±0.01 0.25 ±0.02 0.23 ±0.02
DG 0.12 ±0.02 0.36 ±0.03 0.3 ±0.02
Table 8. Temporary Monopoly: Heavy Tail, X = 200
TS DEG DG
TS 0.0017 ±0.002 0.059 ±0.01 0.16 ±0.02
DEG 0.029 ±0.007 0.23 ±0.02 0.23 ±0.02
DG 0.097 ±0.02 0.34 ±0.03 0.29 ±0.02
Table 9. Temporary Monopoly: Heavy Tail, X = 300
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TS DEG DG
TS 0.002 ±0.003 0.043 ±0.01 0.16 ±0.02
DEG 0.03 ±0.007 0.21 ±0.02 0.24 ±0.02
DG 0.091 ±0.01 0.32 ±0.03 0.3 ±0.02
Table 10. Temporary Monopoly: Heavy Tail, X = 500
Needle-In-Haystack MAB Instance
TS DEG DG
TS 0.34 ±0.03 0.4 ±0.03 0.48 ±0.03
DEG 0.22 ±0.02 0.34 ±0.03 0.42 ±0.03
DG 0.18 ±0.02 0.28 ±0.02 0.37 ±0.03
Table 11. Temporary Monopoly: Needle-in-Haystack, X = 50
TS DEG DG
TS 0.17 ±0.02 0.31 ±0.03 0.41 ±0.03
DEG 0.13 ±0.02 0.26 ±0.02 0.36 ±0.03
DG 0.093 ±0.02 0.23 ±0.02 0.33 ±0.03
Table 12. Temporary Monopoly: Needle-in-Haystack, X = 200
TS DEG DG
TS 0.1 ±0.02 0.28 ±0.03 0.39 ±0.03
DEG 0.089 ±0.02 0.23 ±0.02 0.36 ±0.03
DG 0.05 ±0.01 0.21 ±0.02 0.33 ±0.03
Table 13. Temporary Monopoly: Needle-in-Haystack, X = 300
TS DEG DG
TS 0.053 ±0.01 0.23 ±0.02 0.37 ±0.03
DEG 0.051 ±0.01 0.2 ±0.02 0.33 ±0.03
DG 0.031 ±0.009 0.18 ±0.02 0.31 ±0.02
Table 14. Temporary Monopoly: Needle-in-Haystack, X = 500
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Uniform MAB Instance
TS DEG DG
TS 0.27 ±0.03 0.21 ±0.02 0.26 ±0.02
DEG 0.39 ±0.03 0.3 ±0.03 0.34 ±0.03
DG 0.39 ±0.03 0.31 ±0.02 0.33 ±0.02
Table 15. Temporary Monopoly: Uniform, X = 50
TS DEG DG
TS 0.12 ±0.02 0.16 ±0.02 0.2 ±0.02
DEG 0.25 ±0.02 0.24 ±0.02 0.29 ±0.02
DG 0.23 ±0.02 0.24 ±0.02 0.29 ±0.02
Table 16. Temporary Monopoly: Uniform, X = 200
TS DEG DG
TS 0.094 ±0.02 0.15 ±0.02 0.2 ±0.02
DEG 0.2 ±0.02 0.23 ±0.02 0.29 ±0.02
DG 0.21 ±0.02 0.23 ±0.02 0.29 ±0.02
Table 17. Temporary Monopoly: Uniform, X = 300
TS DEG DG
TS 0.061 ±0.01 0.12 ±0.02 0.2 ±0.02
DEG 0.17 ±0.02 0.21 ±0.02 0.29 ±0.02
DG 0.18 ±0.02 0.22 ±0.02 0.29 ±0.02
Table 18. Temporary Monopoly: Uniform, X = 500
C REPUTATION VS. DATA ADVANTAGE
This section presents all experiments on data vs. reputation advantage (Section 5).
Each experiment is presented as a table with the same semantics as in the main text. Namely,
each cell in the table describes the duopoly game between the entrant’s algorithm (the row) and the
incumbent’s algorithm (the column). The cell specifies the entrant’s market share for the rounds
in which hit was present: the average (in bold) and the 95% confidence interval. NB: smaller average
is better for the incumbent.
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TS DEG DG
TS 0.0096 ± 0.006 0.11 ± 0.02 0.18 ± 0.02
DEG 0.073 ± 0.01 0.29 ± 0.02 0.25 ± 0.02
DG 0.15 ± 0.02 0.39 ± 0.03 0.33 ± 0.02
Table 19. Data Advantage: Heavy Tail, X = 200
TS DEG DG
TS 0.021 ± 0.009 0.16 ± 0.02 0.21 ± 0.02
DEG 0.26 ± 0.03 0.3 ± 0.02 0.26 ± 0.02
DG 0.34 ± 0.03 0.4 ± 0.03 0.33 ± 0.02
Table 20. Reputation Advantage: Heavy Tail, X = 200
TS DEG DG
TS 0.25 ± 0.03 0.36 ± 0.03 0.45 ± 0.03
DEG 0.21 ± 0.02 0.32 ± 0.03 0.41 ± 0.03
DG 0.18 ± 0.02 0.29 ± 0.03 0.4 ± 0.03
Table 21. Data Advantage: Needle-in-Haystack, X = 200
TS DEG DG
TS 0.35 ± 0.03 0.43 ± 0.03 0.52 ± 0.03
DEG 0.26 ± 0.03 0.36 ± 0.03 0.43 ± 0.03
DG 0.19 ± 0.02 0.3 ± 0.02 0.36 ± 0.02
Table 22. Reputation Advantage: Needle-in-Haystack, X = 200
TS DEG DG
TS 0.27 ± 0.03 0.23 ± 0.02 0.27 ± 0.02
DEG 0.4 ± 0.03 0.3 ± 0.02 0.32 ± 0.02
DG 0.36 ± 0.03 0.29 ± 0.02 0.3 ± 0.02
Table 23. Reputation Advantage: Uniform, X = 200
TS DEG DG
TS 0.2 ± 0.02 0.22 ± 0.02 0.27 ± 0.03
DEG 0.33 ± 0.03 0.32 ± 0.03 0.35 ± 0.03
DG 0.32 ± 0.03 0.31 ± 0.03 0.35 ± 0.03
Table 24. Data Advantage: Uniform, X = 200
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TS DEG DG
TS 0.0017 ±0.002 0.06 ±0.01 0.18 ±0.02
DEG 0.04 ±0.009 0.24 ±0.02 0.25 ±0.02
DG 0.12 ±0.02 0.35 ±0.03 0.33 ±0.02
Table 25. Data Advantage: Heavy-Tail, X = 500
TS DEG DG
TS 0.022 ±0.009 0.13 ±0.02 0.21 ±0.02
DEG 0.26 ±0.03 0.29 ±0.02 0.28 ±0.02
DG 0.33 ±0.03 0.39 ±0.03 0.34 ±0.02
Table 26. Reputation Advantage: Heavy-Tail, X = 500
TS DEG DG
TS 0.098 ±0.02 0.27 ±0.03 0.41 ±0.03
DEG 0.093 ±0.02 0.24 ±0.02 0.38 ±0.03
DG 0.064 ±0.01 0.22 ±0.02 0.37 ±0.03
Table 27. Data Advantage: Needle-in-Haystack, X = 500
TS DEG DG
TS 0.29 ±0.03 0.44 ±0.03 0.52 ±0.03
DEG 0.19 ±0.02 0.35 ±0.03 0.42 ±0.03
DG 0.15 ±0.02 0.27 ±0.02 0.35 ±0.02
Table 28. Reputation Advantage: Needle-in-Haystack, X = 500
TS DEG DG
TS 0.14 ±0.02 0.18 ±0.02 0.26 ±0.03
DEG 0.26 ±0.02 0.26 ±0.02 0.34 ±0.03
DG 0.25 ±0.02 0.27 ±0.02 0.34 ±0.03
Table 29. Data Advantage: Uniform, X = 500
TS DEG DG
TS 0.24 ±0.02 0.2 ±0.02 0.26 ±0.02
DEG 0.37 ±0.03 0.29 ±0.02 0.31 ±0.02
DG 0.35 ±0.03 0.27 ±0.02 0.3 ±0.02
Table 30. Reputation Advantage: Uniform, X = 500
Guy Aridor, Kevin Liu, Aleksandrs Slivkins, and Zhiwei Steven Wu 24
D MEAN REPUTATION VS. RELATIVE REPUTATION
We present the experiments omitted from Section 6. Namely, experiments on the Heavy-Tail MAB
instance with K = 3 arms, both for “performance in isolation" and the permanent duopoly game.
We find that DEG > DG according to the mean reputation trajectory but that DG > DEG according to
the relative reputation trajectory and in the competition game. As discussed in Section 6, the same
results also hold for K = 10 for the warm starts that we consider.
The result of the permanent duopoly experiment for this instance is shown in Table 31.
Heavy-Tail
T0 = 20 T0 = 250 T0 = 500
TS vs. DG 0.4 ±0.02
EoG 770 (0)
0.59 ±0.01
EoG 2700 (2979.5)
0.6 ±0.01
EoG 2700 (3018)
TS vs. DEG 0.46 ±0.02
EoG 830 (0)
0.73 ±0.01
EoG 2500 (2576.5)
0.72 ±0.01
EoG 2700 (2862)
DG vs. DEG 0.61 ±0.01
EoG 1400 (556)
0.61 ±0.01
EoG 2400 (2538.5)
0.6 ±0.01
EoG 2400 (2587.5)
Table 31. Duopoly Experiment: Heavy-Tail, K = 3, T = 5000.
Each cell describes a game between two algorithms, call them Alg1 vs. Alg2, for a particular value of the warm
start T0. Line 1 in the cell is the market share of Alg 1: the average (in bold) and the 95% confidence band.
Line 2 specifies the “effective end of game" (EoG): the average and the median (in brackets).
The mean reputation trajectories for algorithms’ performance in isolation:
Finally, the relative reputation trajectory of DEG vs. DG:
